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ARTICLE
PROTECTING THE CULTURAL AND NATURAL
HERITAGE: FINDING COMMON GROUND
Lakshman Guruswamy, Jason C. Roberts & Catina
Drywater*
INTRODUCTION
The cultural heritage of indigenous peoples, a segment of theDNA of our global
community, faces elimination. Because a significant part of the cultural heritage of
humankind is finite and non-renewable, it confronts a threat more perilous than the
possible destruction facing the biological diversity of the natural heritage.1 More
poignantly, the reasons for protecting biological diversity apply with even greater
force to the cultural heritage. While species and animals facing extinction can
reproduce themselves and be raised in captivity, cultural resources are not capable
of such renewal, and are unable to propagate themselves. Once destroyed, they are
lost forever.
This article focuses on how this critical, non-renewable, component of human
civilization may be preserved. The "cultural heritage" being canvassed in this article
possesses intrinsic religious and cultural importance as the heritage of humanity as
well as utilitarian value as the DNA of our civilization. It traverses a broad spectrum
* LakshanGuruswamy is Professor ofLaw and Director of the National Energy-Environmental Law& Policy
Institute (NELPI). Jason C. Roberts, J.D. and M.A (Anthropology), University of Tulsa, and Catina Drywater J.D.,
University of Tulsa.
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of human creativity expressed in archaeological sites, monuments, art, sculpture,
architecture, oral & written records, and living cultures. This cultural heritage
deserves protection for historical, religious, aesthetic, ethnological, anthropological,
and scientific reasons spanning both utilitarian and non-utilitarian rationales.
From a utilitarian standpoint, the cultural heritage embodies invaluable non-
replicableinformation and data about the historic and prehistoric story of humankind.
Such information may relate to the social, economic, cultural, environmental and
climatic conditions of past peoples, their evolving ecologies, adaptive strategies and
early forms of environmental management. The destruction of these storehouses of
knowledge, and the information contained in these libraries of life, could critically
affect how we respond to the continuing challenges of population growth, resource
exhaustion, pollution, and environmental management. From a non-utilitarian
perspective, the despoliation of cultural resources, where they form part of the
religious and cultural traditions of people and civilizations, desecrates the sacred.
The primary objective of this article is to establish a jurisprudential framework
which recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples to their own cultural heritage, and
the duty of the international community to protect such cultural resources. Section
I first examines the form and nature of the cultural heritage and why it is important.
It discusses how even such archetypal examples of cultural resources such as
archaeological sites should be protected for reasons that go beyond the narrow
utilitarian basis hitherto advanced. It then focuses upon indigenous perspectives for
protecting the cultural heritage. Section I goes on to discuss the skepticism felt by
indigenous people about the efforts of outsiders, as distinguished from the efforts of
indigenous peoples themselves, to protect their own cultural heritage.
Section II reviews the jurisprudential principles that might govern the cultural
heritage of humankindby arguing for an ethnographic, as distinct from a state centric
legal framework An etlmographic seam of International Law recognizes the need to
protect the base of the cultural resources pyramid, and thereby supports the cultural
resources belonging to indigenous peoples and communities. This strand of
International Law consists of instruments such as the ILO Convention (169), the
Draft Declaration, and cognate judicial decisions. The present article accepts the
view offered by some modem publicists that we are witnessing the crystallization and
development of customary international law relating to the human and cultural rights
of indigenous peoples.
Section I of this paper examines a growing body of general principles of law,
as defined by Art. 38(1) (c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, found
in the legislation of countries such as the United States of America, Australia, Canada
and New Zealand, that recognizes and institutionalizes the ownership and protection
of cultural resources belonging to indigenous and native peoples.
In Section IV, this article posits that the responsibility for protecting cultural
resources as the heritage of humanity, was recognized in embryo by the 1972
UNESCO Convention, and has now become the duty of the entire international
community. It then suggests a conceptual framework for reconciling the rights of
indigenous peoples to their own cultural resources, with the responsibility of the
[Vol. 34:713
2
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 34 [1998], Iss. 4, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol34/iss4/6
PROTECTING CULTURAL AND NATURAL HERITAGE 715
entire community of nations. Such a synthesis can be achieved by finding common
ground occupied by cultural and natural resources law and policy. The modem
international community should address the problems confronting cultural resources
law similar to the manner in which it dealt with the problems of global warming and
the depletion of biological diversity. It should embrace the principle of common but
differentiated responsibility (CBDR),2 and incorporate the equitable notion that
developed countries should assume primary responsibility for addressing these
common concerns of humanity.
A rider must be entered. This article has the limited objective of establishing
a jurisprudential baseline that recognizes the duty of the international community to
protect the cultural heritage of humankind. The manner in which this principle ought
to be implemented, together with the modalities and operational methods of doing so
will be explored in a sequential article.
I. IMPORTANCE OF INDIGENOUS CULTURAL HERITAGE
The global importance of tangible and intangible remnants which embody
expressions of indigenous peoples in sites, architecture, oral and written records, life
and folk ways, and living cultures, are not adequately recognized by international
treaties. Those treaties which purport to address "cultural property," "cultural
resources" and the"cultural heritage," offer only a restricted protection limited to
narrower aspects of the cultural heritage. While Section II more fully examines the
existing treaty overlay, this section previews how critical aspects of the cultural
heritage of indigenous peoples,' have been omitted from those restricted treaties. A
short explanation of the rationales upon which the cultural heritage may be premised
helps us to identify the extent to which they have or have not been incorporated in
these international agreements.
A. Utilitarian Arguments for Protecting Cultural Heritage
There are a number of utilitarian grounds for protecting the cultural heritage.
The first is that cultural objects possess market value. The 1995 UNIDROIT
Convention stresses the "fundamental importance" of "cultural exchanges" for
protecting cultural heritage.4 Its later provision, providing compensation for the bona
fide purchasers of such cultural objects, underlines the fact that market transactions
and trade in cultural objects remain one of the sanctioned instruments for such
cultural exchange.5 The UNIDROIT convention provides for the return and
2. This principle is specifically articulated in thePreamblepara 6, andArt 3(1) ofthe Climate Change Convention,
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 31 LL.M. 849 (1992) [hereafter Climate Change
Convention], and, impliedly, by the Convention on Biological Diversity, 31 .L.M. 818 (1992).
3. See discussion in Part I1.
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restitution of stolen cultural objects,6 and for the return of illegally exported cultural
objects,7 but stipulates that a bona fide purchaser who exercised due diligence shall
be entitled to fair and reasonable compensation.'
While the UNI]DROIT Convention protects buyers and recognizes the
irreparable damage that can be caused to the cultural heritage of "tribal, indigenous
or other communities"9 by the theft and illegal transfer of cultural objects, it offers
no specific protection to the indigenous communities themselves. As we shall see,
according to this convention, nation states, not the affected peoples or indigenous
communities, are deemed to be the injured parties. Consequently, it is states, not the
affected parties, that are protected and compensated by these international treaties.
In so doing the UNIDROIT Convention ignores the legal property (or patrimonial)
rights of indigenous peoples.
Another utilitarian reason for protecting cultural resources such as monuments,
buildings, and cultures, lies in their value as repositories and storehouses of
knowledge, or archives of human experience.1" The scientific information contained
in each archaeological site, therefore, is a valuable asset because of the knowledge or
information it may yield. 1
The utilitarian benefits of cultural heritage as a knowledge base or library of life
has been explored within the umbrella of archaeology,"2 which applies controlled
methods of excavation and defined principles of examination to extract information
from material remains" of past societies. 4  Traversing the sciences" and
humanities,16 archaeology seeks to reconstruct the behavior and experience of past
communities through the study of their excavated cultural materials.
6. Seeid. atArt. I & 3.
7. See id atArt.5
8. See id. at Arts 4 & 6.
9. UNIDRO1T Convention, infra note 29, at Preamble para. 3.
10. See, e.g., Martin Carver, On Archaeological Value, 70 ANrQurrY, 1996, at. 46,48-50. William D. Lipe, A
Conservation ModelforAmericanArchaeology, in CONSERVATIONARCHAEOLOGY: AGUIDHFORCUL&uLREsotRCE
MMtAGEmaEr~imreis 19, 21-24(Michael B. Schiffer and George J. Gumerman eds., Academic Press 1977).
11. See Lipe, supra note 10. "Archaeologicalsitesareoftenpreciselydatedrepositoriesofmanysortsofbiological
and geological materials that have value to specialists in other fields. [T]he potential of archaeologically derived data
for the understanding of past climates, the evolution of plant and animal species, and the past wanderings of the
magnetic pole. Some such findings have considerable practice relevance. Reconstruction of past climates, for example,
is potentially of importance to long-term planning in agriculturally marginal areas." I4
12. Anthropology is the study of human physical attributes, as well as the non-biological characteristics known as
culture. The three main branches within anthropology are physical (biological) anthropology, cultural (social)
anthropology, and archaeology. See Renfrew, infra note 55.
13. Initsbroadestsense, materialremainsinclude skeletal remains, humanproducednon-artifactual manifestations,
and cultural objects. A people's material culture is made up of the tools, buildings, and other artifacts they
manufactured and used. Id.
14. See idU at 9-10.
15. The science aspect of archaeology includes the collection of data (artifacts, measurements, samples), the
formulation of hypothesis, the testing of hypothesis (experimentation and comparison with other collections of data),
andthe development ofconclusions. Id at 10. See generally, GuYGmsoN, AN'nmopoLOGIcALARcHAEoLooY 35-69,
315-412 (1984).
16. Thehumanityaspect ofarchaeology seeks to reconstruct past social forms from the archaeological record. That
is, archaeology as a humanity interprets collected data and attempts to rebuild past communities' social behavior. See
generally id. at 15-19, 139-77. Thus, archaeology is particularly useful when one wishes to investigate the history of
prehistoric societies or peoples without written records. See Renfrew, infra note 55, at 10.
[Vol. 34:713
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Modem archaeology has fractured into focused sub-disciplines in order better
to address the full spectrum of knowledge presented by past societies, draw a more
accurate picture of earlier communities' life-ways, and learn about the formation
processes involved in creating the archaeological record.17 Thus, ethno-archaeology,
underwater archaeology, geo-archaeology, zoo-archaeology and environmental
archaeology were developed as archaeological sub-disciplines to produce specialized
strategies for the collection of information that traditional methods and procedures of
archaeology could not address.
18
Information obtained as a result of such studies is potentially beneficial to the
modem world.19 For example, studies in environmental archaeology can help
governments and organizations compare current stresses imposed by population
growth on the modem environment to those observed in the past.2' Similarly, this
information may prove useful to present societies by enabling them to examine the
strategies developed by past peoples to overcome environmental or climatic change.
Data acquired from environmental archaeological investigations could also provide
present societies with beneficial information about environment and management
practices of past communities.2 1 This information could then be used to make choices
on how to exploit the modem environment in a sustainable and productive manner.'
B. Intrinsic (Non-Utilitarian) Reasons for Protecting the Cultural Heritage
The intrinsic value of cultural heritage lies in the fact that people receive
enjoyment and gratification from the knowledge that it exists.' The cultural heritage
of humankind is valuable because of what it expresses in aesthetic, historic and
religious ways and not simply because of the benefits it confers upon us. Its
destruction, just like the extinction of whales, chimpanzees, or elephants, fills us with
dismay. Such feelings without the need for more elaborate reasoning provides a
compelling rationale for conservation.
Moreover, the cultural heritage, and the affiliated cultural items of a people,
fosters dignity by promoting the identity and comprehension of their own culture.24
Thus, the significance of a people retaining control over their cultural resources is
that they are provided with the ability to have access to their past in order to define
their cultural distinctiveness.
17. See Renfrew, infra note 54, at 11.
18. See id.
19. Environmental archaeological studies are potentially more useful if their emphasis is on the regional level, or
site systems, instead of a single site within a specific location. See Renfrew, infra note 55, at 232.
20. For example, the damage non-sustainable population growth has on past environments has been described as
a factor for the collapse ofthe Mayan civilization. T.PAIcKCLBETTHECOU.APSEOFOASSICMAYACWnZMON,
iNTHECOUAPSEoPANCINTSTAsANDCVLi7AZoNS 69,75-81 (Norman Yoffee &George L. Cowgill eds., 1991).
21. See Renfrew, infra note 55, at 468-69.
22. See Lipe, supra note 10, at 23.
23. See Martin Carver, On Archaeological Value, 70 ANuQurrY, 1996,45-56, at 46.
24. It is argued that a community's associated cultural resources "represent the cultural heritage of their creators
and are in fact the cultural patrimony of these people:' Antonia DeMeo, More Effective Protection for Native
American Cultural Property Through Regulation of Export, 19 AM. IND. L. REV. 1, 2-4 (1994).
1999]
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Many indigenous people articulate a spiritual or ethical basis for protecting their
culture and way of life. In some cases they are joined by archaeologists who see the
value in investigating how their way of life has evolved and survived through the
centuries. Indigenous peoples condemn the destruction of their way of life with a
revulsion no different than the sacrilegious desecration of a temple, church or icon.
Their feelings arise as much from their wonder at contemplating their own culture as
from fear of the unknown consequences of ignorantly, and perhaps wantonly,
destroying the unreplicable outcome of an awesome human drama. Archaeology
exemplifies intrinsic reasons for protecting the cultural heritage in addition to
utilitarian reasons. The example of archaeological sites clearly demonstrates this.
Archaeological sites illustrate the interplay of different rationales for protecting the
cultural heritage of indigenous peoples. Such sites form a critical component of the
cultural heritage of humankind, and depending on what is uncovered, archaeological
remnants can offer revealing evidence of the cultural heritage. While the nature and
character of cultural resources varies from location to location, in regard to size,
depth, original use, contents, and length of occupation,' they share a common
characteristic as storehouses of knowledge about human behavior and experience6
at micro and macro levels.
For example, an archaeological investigation carried out within a large, complex
city, such as Cahokia,V which was inhabited for a long period, offers evidence of a
wide range of human behavior, and produces a multitude of artifacts on a macro
scale. On the other hand, an archaeological site could also represent a micro
experience in the remnants of a single event or occupation. A mammoth kill and
butchering site is evidence of a single human occupation, and is confined to a
relatively small area. Such a site is valuable evidence of the cultural heritage even
though it is likely only to be composed of the mammoth's remains and a few
discarded stone tools.
As we have seen, some parts of the cultural heritage found in archaeological
sites are marketable cultural items. The 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means
of Prohibiting and Preserving the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership
of Cultural Property (1970 UNESCO Convention)' and the UNIDROIT Convention
on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects (UNIDROIT Convention)29 focus
on marketable cultural items and attempt to prevent the illicit trade in moveable
cultural objects. They define cultural property in a manner consistent with this
25. See generally id
26. See generally id.
27. Cahokia (750-1450 C.E.) was a large city located at the confluence ofthe Missouri and Mississippi rivers near
present day St. Louis. Madeupofplazas and a multitude of earthen mounds, at its height Cahokia is estimated to have
supported a population of 30,000 people. See AUCEB. KEHoE, NoRtmA ucANNcm IAms 172-75 (1992).
28. UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preserving the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of
Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 4, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereafter 1970 UNESCO Convention].
29. International Institute for the Unification ofPrivateLaw (UNIDROIT): Final Actofthe Diplomatic Conference
for the Adoption of the Draft UNIDROIT Convention on the International Return of Stolen or Illegally Exported
Cultural Objects, opened for signature June 24, 1995, 34 LLM. 1322 (1995) [hereafter UNIDROIT Convention].
[Vol. 34:713
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purpose and objective3 to include objects possessing market value that can be
bought and sold as objects of art.
While the 1970 Convention represents a start, marketable objects are only one
component of the cultural heritage. The cultural heritage requiring protection must
also include such cultural resources and objects that do not command a market price.
They may be made up of physically manufactured items such as broken pottery
shards, stone tools, bone tools, or scraps of clothing. Non-marketable items could
also take the form of human produced residues, such as butchered animal remains,
soil stains, post molds, the distribution of stone tools, settlement patterns, pollen
grains and other botanical remains. An interconnected problem confronting the
preservation of the cultural heritage springs from economic pressures that call for
market values when evaluating cultural resources. Despite the fact that the cultural
heritage is a valuable source of information, it is difficult to place a market price on
archaeological sites and cultural resources that make up the cultural heritage." This
is especially problematic when the need to preserve sites possessing archaeological
materials must be balanced against market- driven forces that seek to develop land
for housing or commercial use. 2 In the event of the outcome being determined by the
use of a cost benefit analysis, the intangible benefits of cultural heritage must be
shadow-priced against the more easily discernible and evident market price of the
sites or resources. The cultural heritage tends to lose in such a contest.
The UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and
Natural Heritage (1972 UNESCO Convention)33 seeks to address this problem by
defining the cultural heritage so as to embrace both cultural property and cultural
resources. It requires protection of the cultural heritage that includes monuments,
30. The 1970 UNESCO Convention and the UNIDROIT Convention both use the following definition of cultural
property:
[Clultural property means property which, on religious or secular grounds, is specifically
designated by each State as being of importance for archeology, prehistory, history, literature, art
or sciences and which belongs to the following categories: (a) [riare collections and specimens of
fauna, flora, minerals, and anatomy, and objects ofpalaeontological interest; (b) property relating
to history, including the history of science and technology and military and social history, to the
life of national leaders, thinkers, scientists and artists and to events of national importance; (c)
products of archaeological excavations (including regular and clandestine) or of archaeological
discoveries; (d) elements of artistic or historical monuments or archaeological sites which have
been dismembered; (e) antiquities more than one hundred years old, such as inscriptions, coins and
engraved seals; (f) objects of ethnological interest; (g) property of artistic interest, such as: (i)
pictures, paintings and drawings produced entirely by hand on any support and in any material
(excluding industrial designs and manufactured articles decorated by hand); (ii) original works
of statuary art and sculpture in any material; (iii) original engravings, prints and lithographs; (iv)
original artistic assemblages and montages in any material; (h) rare manuscripts and incunabula,
old books, documents and publications of special interest (historical, artistic, scientific, literary,
etc.) singly or in collections; (i) postage, revenue nd similar stamps, singly or in collections ; Q)
archives, including sound, photographic and cinematographic archives; (k) articles of furniture
more than one hundred years old and old musical instruments.
See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 28, at Art. 1; see also, UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 29, at Art.
2 and Annex.
31. See Martin Carver, ONARCHAEOLOGICALVALUE, 70 Antiquity, 1996, at 45-56.
32. See id. at 4647.
33. UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Nov. 16,1972,
27 U.S.T. 37, T.IAS. No. 8226 [hereafter 1972 UNESCO Convention].
1999]
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groups of buildings, and sites that are of historic, artistic, scientific, aesthetic,
ethnological, or anthropological value. 4 While this definition of cultural heritage is
more expansive and attempts to offer more protection, it is limited to corporeal
property and excludes living cultures.
By contrast, this article uses a more expansive definition of cultural heritage
that includes the ways of life or culture of a society or people that embraces
knowledge, beliefs, art, morals, laws, customs, rituals, thought ways, language and
music, and argues that each should be given legal protection. Before discussing how
this might be done it is necessary to take account and address the views of
indigenous peoples who are skeptical and suspicious of any alleged attempts to
protect the cultural heritage, and to discuss the recent efforts of indigenous peoples
to become involved in and in control of protecting their cultural heritage.
C. Indigenous Peoples' Skepticism about Outsiders
There is an emerging consensus among indigenous peoples worldwide on how
to view their cultural heritage and respond to the issues surrounding its possession
and acquisition. In particular, a majority of indigenous peoples share feelings of
distrust and injustice towards non-indigenous acquisition of cultural property whether
by collectors or archaeologists. As with all distinct nations, indigenous peoples prefer
to retain ownership of their cultural property or at least to have some input regarding
its ownership."5 In fact, "indigenous peoples cannot survive, or exercise their
fundamental human rights as distinct nations, societies and peoples, without the
ability to conserve, revive, develop and teach the wisdom they have inherited from
their ancestors."36
Central to the indigenous view point on cultural property is the concept of
communal ownership.37 Communal ownership, in terms of cultural property, posits
that cultural property is a communal right and can only be shared upon consent of the
group as a whole through the appropriate community or national decision-making
34. See id at Art. 1.
35. These Indigenous Peoples are critical of those who have succumbed to commercial pressure, or have chosen
to capitalize on thegreed ofart collectors and even archaeologists. Seee.g., WalterAlva, Discovering theNewWorld's
Richest Unlooted Tomb, NAmONALGEOGRAPmHC, Oct. 1988, at 510. (In Peru, Native looters, known as huaqueros, raid
archaeological locations in hopes of finding artifacts to sell so that they may live between sugarcane harvests).
Christopher S. Byrne, Chilkat Indian Tribe v. Johnson and NAGPRA: Have We Finally Recognized Communal
Property Rights in Cultural Objects?, 8 L ENvm. L. & LrnG. 109 (1993) (Individual tribal member was persuaded
by an art dealer to sell four wooden posts which were integral to the maintenance of the cultural identity of the Chilkat
people).
36. Study on the Protection ofthe Cultural and Intellectual Property of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Sub-Commission
on Prevention ofDiscrimination and Protection ofMinorities, at4, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/Sub.2/1993/28 (1993) (hereafter
U.N. Study).
37. See, e.g., U.N. Study, supra note 36, at 4; Christopher S. Byrne, Chilkat Indian Tribe v. Johnson and
NAGPRA: Have We Finally Recognized Communal PropertyRights in Cultural Objects?, 8 J.ENVTL. &Lno.109
(1993); Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies Commission (ICIP Project), Proposals
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procedures." This is a concept which has neither been accepted nor understood by
the dominant societies of those nations colonized by Western European states.
The differences in perception of cultural property between indigenous peoples
and dominant societies are clearly illustrated by the experience of Native Americans.
The feelings of distrust and injustice harbored by Native Americans toward
archaeologists are derived from gross violations of basic human rights. For example,
widespread grave looting which took place in the early 1800s was initiated in the
name of "science" and perpetuated by United States policies.39 During this period,
the study of "craniology" was founded and individuals "sought to devise tests to
categorize humans and to validate the theory of white supremacy." These
individuals vigorously recruited the help of others in obtaining Native skulls. In
1860, the United States army continued this practice by ordering military officers to
confiscate bodies found in Indian burials as well as the heads of any Indians who had
been killed in battle.41 Specifically, the "directive [of the U.S. army] urged medical
officers stationed in the Indian country or in the vicinity of ancient mounds or
cemeteries... to contribute skulls."'42 "Museums and universities, as well as federal
and state agencies across the nation, hold booty consisting of human remains and
burial offerings, which stand as vivid monuments to this legacy."'43
Consequently, many Native Americans "seebody snatching and archaeological
research as being another in a long series of painful and humiliating injustices
-including dispossession, coercive assimilation, and genocide-committed upon
them by white society. '44 Further, the acquisition of cultural artifacts by archaeolo-
gists and museums is perceived as contributing to the cultural debasement of native
peoples, because it often deprives them of special religious and ceremonial items
which are needed to carry on their traditions.45
Religious symbols, artifacts and burial grounds that form part of the cultural
heritage of indigenous people have been plundered. The desecration and destruction
of ancestral sites and the pillaging of sacred objects, has, according to some
commentators, become part of a vicious cycle involving multiple layers of looters,
dealers, and galleries. 6 Even those archaeologists, whose study of ancient cultures
may help to create group pride, have often been guilty of excavating burials and
examining skeletal remains without seeking or receiving permission from the
38. See U.N. Study, supra note 36, at 9.
39. See James Riding in, Without Ethics and Morality: A Historical Overview of imperial Archaeology and
American Indians, 24 AR1t. ST. LJ. 11, 17-22 (1992).
40. See U
41. See id. at 18.
42. Seeid.
43. See . at 12.
44. See id. at 26.
45. See Bowen Blair, Indian Rights: Native Americans Versus American Museums-A Battle for Artifacts, in
NAiTVE AMmCAm CumuIRAL AND RELGIOUS FREEDoMS 279,279 (John R. Wunder ed., 1996).
46. See Nichols et al, Ancestral Sites, Shrines, and Graves: Native American Perspectives on the Ethics of
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associated indigenous community.47
In addition to the methods used by non-natives to acquire Native American
cultural property, there is resentment over the purposes for obtaining and studying the
cultural property, in particular the human remains, of Native peoples. These
disagreements center on the dramatic differences between the world views of most
Native American tribes and the dominant society regarding the treatment of human
remains and cultural resources. While the numerous differences between each tribe
and the dominant society are too broad for this article to explore, it is imperative to
note the general differences.
For the most part, Native Americans maintain holistic world-views. 4' That is,
"all worlds-natural and supernatural, ancestral and contemporary-and their
inhabitants [are] simultaneous, coequal, and balanced." '49 The dominant society's
world-view conceives of life in a more compartmentalized manner."0 Each realm of
life-art, religion, law, economics, etc.-is viewed as segmented and separated from
all other areas."1 These "rigid distinctions" are non-existent in Native societies. As
such, all things are related and interdependent. The distinction between private and
federal lands too is seen as anomalous and a number of tribal ordinances"2 reflect the
position that even off reservation cultural resources found on private lands should be
protected in the same way as federal laws protect archaeological resources on federal
and state lands. 53
This clash of belief systems has created an atmosphere ripe for conflict as
Native peoples are often unwilling to separate their beliefs from their cultural
property, as many archaeologists would have them do. In addition, some tribal views
concerning the dead are irreconcilable with the dominant world-view. For example,
some tribes believe that handling the bones of the dead or even talking about them can
lead to spiritual illness.'
Native American peoples are not alone in their opinions of archaeology and the
potential harm it may cause to their associated cultural material. Indigenous people
worldwide have shared similar experiences. In Australia, many Aboriginal people
believe that all human remains and some cultural property should be returned to
thenL' Aborigines have endured violations tantamount to those experienced by
Native Americans. Numerous skeletal remains were excavated and studied as late as
1940, without the consultation of Aboriginal communities.5 6 The Aborigines have
expressed concern over the "institutionalisation [sic], fragmentation, and alienation
47. See id.
48. See Rennard Strickland, Implementing theNationalPolicy OfUnderstanding, Preserving, andSafeguarding
the Heritage of Indian Peoples and Native Hawaiians: Human Rights; Sacred Objects, and Cultural Patrimony,
24 ARIuz ST. L.J. 175 (1992).
49. Id. at 182.
50. See i.
51. Seeid.
52. See id. at 217.
53. See Patrick O'Driscoll, Law to Return Indian Remains Bogged Down, USA ToDAY, March 9, 1998, at 2A
54. See id.
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of [their] cultural heritage. '5 7 They "feel a deep responsibility to their ancestors to
respect their remains and to repatriate them, if necessary, to their rightful burial
grounds."'  As a result, "Aboriginal communities are demanding information
regarding the extent of museum holdings of their cultural property, a role in
management of those properties, and legislation to facilitate return of cultural
materials to their group of origin."'
Additionally, indigenous peoples in Canada have expressed the same concerns.
They too, are attempting to facilitate the return of cultural property that has been
obtained by grave robbing and theft.' "Existing legislation and current common law
confer title to indigenous cultural objects which are not in the possession of the source
communities in either the Crown or the current possessor., 61 However, a number of
native groups have been urging Canada to pass legislation requiring the repatriation
of cultural objects.62
In New Zealand, the view of a majority of Maori is that the past should not be
examined. "The history they pass down among themselves is secret, sacred
information, not for public discussion." 3 As a result, they would prefer that any
remains or discovered artifacts be destroyed by natural elements instead of displayed
or studied.64
D. Efforts by Indigenous Peoples to Protect Their Cultural Heritage
While the commonality among these perspectives is distrust toward certain
aspects and practices of archaeology, there is a trend among indigenous peoples that
recognizes the contribution that archaeology can make toward the preservation of
their cultural heritage. Consequently, a number of Native peoples have become
involved in the archaeological process by creating their own archaeological entities
which promote tribal policies. For example, the White Mountain Apache tribe has
created its own archaeological program entitled the 'White Mountain Apache
Heritage Program" which is dedicated to "resuming control over and resuming
responsibility for information, places, and objects pertaining to [White Mountain
57. Theresa Simpson, Claims of Indigenous Peoples To Cultural Property In Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand, 18 HAsmNrsI f&COMP.L.REV. 195,206 (1994).
58. AustralinInstitute ofAboriginalandTorres Strat Islander Studies Commission (ICIPProject), Proposalsfor
the Recognition and Protection of Indigenous Cultural and Intellectual Property at §3.5.2 (visited May 7, 1998)
<http'J/www.icip.lawneLcorLau'mdex.html>.
59. Id.
60. See Catherine BeU, Aboriginal Claims to Cultural Property in Canada: A Comparative Legal Analysis of
the Repatriation Debate, 17 An. IrAN L. R-v. 457 (1992).
61. See Simpson, supra note 57, at 213.
62. See iUL at 214.
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Apache] culture and history."'6 Possessing four primary functional areas, the White
Mountain Apache program addresses: 1) repatriation, cultural education and
documentation; 2) collections management; 3) the Fort Apache Historical Park; and
4) historic preservation.' The White Mountain Apache are not alone in their efforts;
other tribes, such as the Navajo, have also developed similar programs.'
The effort of indigenous peoples to become involved and control archaeological
research is also occurring in countries other than the United States. For example, the
Shuswap people of British Columbia are now participating in a program that offers
archaeological training to members in the Native community." The program, which
is a collaboration between Simon Frasier University and the Secwepemec Cultural
Education Society enables the aboriginal community to participate in and learn about
the archaeological process. 9 These developments have created an atmosphere in
which tribal values can be adequately addressed and have paved the way for utilizing
archaeology to protect the cultural heritage of indigenous peoples.
In addition to the emerging programs within various countries, indigenous
peoples worldwide have taken steps in the international arena to protect their cultural
heritage. For example, in recognition of the United Nations International Year for the
World's Indigenous Peoples, the Nine Tribes of Mataatua, ofAotearoa New Zealand,
convened a conference on Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights of Indigenous
Peoples in 1993. The conference led to the adoption of the Mataatua Declaration.7"
The Mataatua Declaration asserts the rights of Indigenous People to self-determina-
tion and the ownership of cultural and intellectual property, while remaining mindful
of their ability and willingness to act as stewards or custodians of that heritage for the
benefit of all humanity. Specifically, the Preamble of Mataatua Declaration states:
Indigenous Peoples are capable of managing their traditional knowledge
themselves, but are willing to offer it to all humanity provided their fundamental
rights to define and control this knowledge are protected by the international
community.71
This declaration demonstrates the resolve of indigenous peoples to finally assert,
based on their own terms and belief systems, the need to possess, control and protect
their own cultural property, and to recognize its value to all of humankind..
65. John R. Welch, Origins of the White Mountain Apache Heritage Program, SOCIETY FOR AMERICAN
ARCHAEOLOGYBUuREIN, November 1997, vol. 15. at 15.
66. Id. at 8.
67. Alan S. Downer and Alexandra Roberts, The Navajo Experience With The Federal Historic Preservation
Program, 10 WTRNAT. REsOuRCEs &ENv '39 (1996).
68. George P. Nicholas, Archaeology, Education, and the Secwepemc, SocImYFOR AmERicANARcHAmooY
But.mLN, March 1997, vol. 15., at 8.
69. See id
70. SeeAustraliannstitute fAbriginalandTorresStraitslanderStudiesCommission(IIPProject),Proposals
for the Recognition and Protection of Indigenous Cultural and Intellectual Property at Information Sheet 6 §6.1,
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II. THE TREATY OVERLAY
An analysis of the international legal frameworks dealing with the trends and
developments described above helps us to better appreciate and assess the response
of law and policy to the issues we have raised. There are two broad approaches,
which are dealt with under the rubrics of state centered and ethno-centered treaties.
A. The State-Centered Treaties
The principal state-centered international agreements addressing the protection
of cultural property and sites are the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (Hague Convention)7 2 the 1970
UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import,
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (1970 UNESCO Conven-
tion),73 the UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects
(UNIDROIT Convention), 74 and the 1972 UNESCO Convention Concerning the
Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972 UNESCO
Convention).7' Although each of these state-centered international instruments have
serious shortcomings, they embody concepts and ideas that can be constructively
linked to the emerging ethno-centered international laws that protect the rights of
indigenous peoples.
1. The Hague Convention
The widespread destruction resulting from the extensive bombing and looting
during the World Wars was the genesis of the Hague Convention.76 The first modem
international agreement to protect works of art, the Hague Convention prohibits
wartime pillaging or the destruction of art objects unless military necessity dictates
otherwise
72. Convention fortheProtectionofCultural Property in the Event ofArmed Conflict, May 14,1954,249 U.N.T.S.
240. Reprinted at UNESCO Legal Instruments, Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, (visited Mar. 12, 1998),<http.//www.unesco.orglgeneraleng/legal/cltheritage/hague index.html>.
73. See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 28.
74. International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT): Final Act of the Diplomatic
Conference for the Adoption of the Draft UNIDROIT Convention on the International Return of Stolen or Illegally
Exported Cultural Objects, opened for signature June 24, 1995, 34 LL.M. 1322 (1995) [hereinafter UNIDROIT
Convention]. Reprinted at the Official Web Site of the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(UNIDRO1T), Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, (visited April 15, 1998)
<http://www.unidroit.orgenglish/conventionsc-culLhtm>.
75. Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Nov. 16,1972,27 U.S.T.
37, T.I.A.S. No. 8226. Reprinted at UNESCO Legal Instruments, Convention Concerning the Protection of the World
Cultural and Natural Heritage, (visited April 5, 1998) <http.//www.unesco.org/whe/worldh>.
76. See generally, David A. Meyer, The 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention and its Emergence into
Customary International Law, 11 B.U. Ir'L LJ. 349 (1993).
77. See Hague Convention, supra note 72, at art. 4(1), (2), and (3).
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This Convention's rationale and preventative measures for preserving cultural
resources in-situ are significant to the extent that it establishes the principle of the
"cultural heritage of mankind." Its preamble states that "the preservation of the
cultural heritage is of great importance for all peoples of the world and that it is
important that this heritage should receive international protection" ' It is, however,
very restrictive in scope, because it applies only'during military conflict. 9 Further-
more, this international articulation of the cultural heritage of all people was
countervailed by the more nationalistic impact of the 1970 UNESCO Convention.
2. The 1970 UNESCO Convention
Unlike the Hague Convention, which emphasizes the importance of cultural
resources to the world's heritage, the 1970 UNESCO Convention seeks to protect
cultural property through a policy of national retention. 0 Developed to offer some
protective measures for cultural resources during times of peace, the 1970 UNESCO
Convention was adopted as a means to inhibit illicit international trade in cultural
property." It attempts to do so by regulating the movement of cultural objects by
providing provisions which allow countries to enter into pacts providing for mutual
recognition and enforcement of each country's cultural resource laws. 2
The 1970 UNESCO Convention's limited definition of cultural property is
currently the most comprehensive international attempt to classify a group of objects
which are to be protected from illicit trade in cultural material. In contrast to the
internationalism of the Hague convention, however, the 1970 UNESCO Convention
is state-centric and requires states to designate specific items as protected cultural
property 3 based upon the objects' importance to "archaeology, prehistory, history,
literature, art or science."'  Likewise, the Convention's Preamble is state-centric.8"
Ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples are not identified within the language of this
Preamble.86
Although eighty-five nations have signed and ratified the 1970 UNESCO
Convention,' it is "widely regarded as ineffectual, ' 88 even as a means of controlling
illicit trade because the purchaser nations from western Europe and Japan have not
78. Id. at Preamble.
79. See i&
80. See John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of ThinkingAbout Cultural Property, 8O AM.L J.INLL. 831,842-848
(1986).
81. See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 28, at arts. 2,3,7,9,14.
82. See id. at art. 9,13, and 15. Thus, the 1970 UNESCO Convention enables aggrieved nations to bring claims,
based upon their own domestic cultural property laws, for illegally transferred cultural resources in the courts of those
signatory countries with whom they have entered into agreements. Id. art 13.




87. See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 28, at List of State Parties to the Convention on the Means of
Prohibiting and Preserving the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property
<http.//www.unesco.org/general/eng/legalItheritagetbh572-rat.htmbl>.
88. Jerry Theodorou, A New International LawforAntiquities?, MmERVA, MarchlApdl 1992, at 32.
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joined.89 The only art importing nations to have ratified this Convention are the
United States,90 Canada9' and Australia. 92
The state-centric nature of the 1970 UNESCO Convention and its focus on
marketable cultural objects do not capture the full range or value of cultural
resources, even though it does briefly address the cultural significance of these
objects. 93 By conferring upon states the exclusive function of formulating registers
of the "significant" objects it wishes to protect, the 1970 UNESCO Convention
appears to exclude both the international community as well as indigenous peoples. 4
3. The UNII)RO1T Convention
The UNIDROIT Convention, drafted by the International Institute for the
Unification of Law (UNIDROIT), seeks to further the 1970 UNESCO Convention's
purpose of regulating the transboundary movement of cultural objects. At the request
of UNESCO in 1984,9' UNLDROIT initiated an attempt to enhance the 1970
UNESCO Convention's effectiveness. 96 After a series of draft meetings conducted
between 1986 and 1994,97 the UNIDROIT Convention was adopted on June 24,
1995.9 Three nations have ratified this Convention and two have acceded to its
provisions." In accordance with Article 12, paragraph 1 of the UNIDROIT
Convention,10° this latest attempt to regulate marketable cultural objects entered into
force on July 1, 1998.'1
In short, the UNIDROIT Convention has sought, through clearer organization,
to create a uniform body of cultural property law. However, it only differs from the
1970 UNESCO Convention on a few points of application. These differences include
the UNIDROIT Convention's distinction between stolen cultural objects and illegally
89. See id. at 37.
90. See Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 6601-2613 (1988).
91. See Cultural Property Export and Import Act, S.C., ch 50, § 31(2) (1975) (Can.).
92. See Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act, 1986 Austl. C. Acts 11.
93. According to the 1970 UNESCO Convention Preamble, "cultural property constitutes one ofthebasic elements
of civilization and national culture, and that its true value can be appreciated only in relation to the fullest possible
information regarding its origin, history and traditional setting." See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 28, at
Preamble.
94. Id. A State attempting to designate important cultural property for inclusion within the 1970 UNESCO
Convention, may overlook the cultural resources of the minorities or indigenous peoples who reside in its territory.
Additionally, states cannot protect unknown cultural objects under Article 1 of the UNESCO Convention.
95. See Jerome M. Eisenberg, Conservation and the Antiquities Trade, MINERVA, MarJApr. 1994 at 38.
96. See Theodorou, supra note 88 ,at 32.
97. See Spencer A. Kinderman, The UNIDRO1TDraft Convention on Cultural Objects: An Examination of the
Need for a Uniform Legal Frameworkfor Controlling the Illicit Movement of Cultural Property, 7 EMORY I,'L L.
REV. 457,502,526 (1993).
98. See UNIDRO1T News: 1997-2, UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects
(visited April 15, 1998) <http://www.unidroitorgtenglish/news/news-97-2.htm>. There are currently 22 signatory
States to the UNIDROIT Convention. See State Signatories (visited April 15, 1998)
<http.//www.unidroit.orgienglish/inplementi-95.htm>.
99. See id.
100. See UNIDROT Convention, supra note 29, at art. 12(1).
101. See State Signatories, supra note 98, China, Ecuador, Lithuania, Paraquay and Romania are all signatories.
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exported cultural objects,"° the compensation of bona fide purchasers," °3 the ability
of both states and individuals to make claims in foreign courts" and the placement
of time limits on claims of stolen or illegally exported cultural property."°5 Like the
1970 UNESCO Convention, the UNIDROIT Convention's state-centric focus on
marketable art objects offers indirect protection, at best, for the contents of
undisturbed archaeological sites.
4. The 1972 UNESCO Convention
The 1972 UNESCO Convention is more internationalist. It requires every state
to submit an inventory of any property which constitutes a part of cultural and
natural heritage to the World Heritage Committee (Committee). The Committee then
determines whether the property should be listed on the 'World Heritage List" by
considering whether the property meets two pre-conditions. First, a site must be
recognized as outstanding. Second, the site must already have adequate legal and or
traditional management mechanisms to ensure its protection." The cultural heritage
protected by the 1972 UNESCO Convention is confined to properties that are of
"outstanding universal value" as defined by the Committee. " By insisting on these
pre-requisites, this Convention effectively excludes much of the cultural property of
indigenous peoples which lack both recognition and protection.
The attempts of the foregoing treaties to protect cultural resources and property
suffer from two significant defects. First, there are limitations inherent in the 1970
UNESCO Convention's almost exclusive focus on marketable objects and how to
arrest the flow of illegally obtained marketable objects. This emphasis on marketable
art objects fails to recognize or protect the full range and value of cultural and
religious resources of intrinsic worth, many of them found in-situ, that do not possess,
or cannot be reduced to, monetary or market values.
Second, both the 1970 and 1972 UNESCO conventions assign the sole
responsibility of identifying and designating cultural property to states, and ignores
the indigenous peoples or communities to whom they might belong. This has resulted
in the failure to properly identify cultural property or resources because many
nations, by design or neglect, have woefully ignored the cultural property and
resources of indigenous and native peoples and communities.
Third, the 1972 UNESCO Convention, while recognizing cultural and natural
resources are a part of the heritage of the world, focuses exclusively on the apex
rather than the base of the cultural resources pyramid. Even though it creates a
102. See UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 29, at art. I, chs. H1 and IM.
103. See id. at art. 4(1)-(5) and art. 6(1) and (3)(a)(b). Good faith purchasers are to be compensated by claimants.
I. at art. 4(3) and art. 6(1), (3).
104. See i. at art. 8 (1).
105. See U at art. 3 (3)-(5), (7)-(8) and art. 5 (5). Claims brought by indigenous or tribal peoples for the restoration
of"sacred or communally important cultural objects' are treated as "public collection" and, therefore; they may have
an extended limitation of 75 years. ld at art. 3 (5) & 3 (8).
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framework for the treatment of cultural resources, located within nations, as the
cultural and natural heritage of humankind," 8 and sets up a fund for its protection, 9
administered by a World Heritage committee, ° the cultural heritage protected by it
is limited to glamorous, major archaeological or historic sites of "outstanding
universal value." These properties have been defined in a way that excludes much
of the cultural property of indigenous peoples. We now turn to a different strand of
international law that recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples.
B. Ethno-centered Legal Developments
1. The International Labour Organization Convention No. 169111
The negotiation and adoption of the ILO Convention No. 169 represented a
dynamic shift in state attitude toward the identity of indigenous peoples within the
global community."' Convention No. 169 replaced the ILO's 1957 pro-assimilation
Convention No. 107,"' an instrument that promoted nationalism by requiring
indigenous integration into the dominant societies of those countries in which Native
communities lived. 114
Although the ILO Convention No. 169 specifically addresses the rights of
indigenous peoples without the depreciative language of assimilation, several
indigenous rights advocates voiced disapproval over the Convention's failure to fully
shed state authority over indigenous communities."' Furthermore, these critics
attacked the ILO Convention No. 169 on the basis that it included weak, equivocal
108. See id. at art. 6 which reads: "States parties to this Convention recognize that such heritage constitutes a world
heritage for whose protection it is the duty of the international community as a whole to co-operate." (Emphasis
added).
109. See id. atart 15.
110. Seeidatart8.
111. International Labour Organization (No.169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries, June 27, 1989 (entered into force Sept. 5, 1990) [hereafter ILO Convention (169)].
112. See S.JAMS ANAYAINDIOENOusPEOPLESININTERNAIIONALLAW 47-49 (1996); see also, S. James Anaya,
Indigenous Rights Norms in Contemporary International Law, 8 ARiz. J. IN''L & COMP. L. 1,6-9 (199 1); and Dean
B. Suagee, Human Rights oflndigenous People: Will the United States Rise to the Occasion ?, 21 AL. INDIAN L REV.
365, 367-368 (1997). For an account of the formation and adoption of the LO Convention No. 169, see generally
Russell I Brash, An Advocate's Guide to the Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, 15 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REV. 209 (1990); Lee Swepston, A New Step in the International Law on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples: 1LO
Convention No. 169 of 1989, 15 OKI.A. Crry U. L. REv. 677 (1990).
113. Convention (No. 107) Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-
Tribal Populations in Independent Countries, June 26, 1957, International Labour Conference, 328 U.N.T.S. 247
(entered into force June 2, 1959). In 1986, the International Labour Organization sponsored an assembly of "experts,"
which included representatives from the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, that advised the revision of the outdated
Convention No. 107. See Anaya, supra note 112, at 47. Convention No. 169, an instrument intended to cure the
integrationist language of Convention No. 107, was adopted by the International Labour Conference at the end of its
1989 session. The new Convention was brought into enforcement in 1991 when it was ratified by Mexico and Norway.
Id. at 47-48. See also Anaya, supra note 112, at 6-7.
114. See Anaya, supra note 112, at47-48. See also Anayasupra note 11, at 6-7. See also examples of assinmilative
language in the preamble to ILO Convention (107), supra note 111.
115. "... [S]everal advocates of indigenous peoples' rights expressed dissatisfaction with language in Convention No.
169, viewing it as not sufficiently constraining of government conduct in relation to indigenous peoplesc concerns." See
Anaya, supra note 112, at 48 and n. 61; see also iL at 7-8.
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language and appeared to be framed in the "form of recommendations."'1 16 However,
other respected commentators such as James Anaya point out that the claims
forwarded by such critics were "couched in highly legalistic terms and worst-case
scenario readings of the convention without much regard for the overall text."'1 7
The underlying objective of the ILO Convention No. 169 is manifest in its
preambular language, which proclaims that "the aspirations of [Indigenous] peoples
to exercise control over their own institutions, ways of life and economic development
and to maintain and develop their identities, languages and religions, within the
framework of the States in which they live." ' While this preambular expression
does not specifically address the right of indigenous peoples to retain control over
their associated cultural heritage, Native communities could not fully "maintain and
develop their identities, languages and religions"119 without such security. Thus, it
may be argued that the maintenance and development of indigenous "identities,
languages and religions""'12 would be hollow without the ability of Native peoples to
control the manifestations of their heritage. Consequently, it could further be argued
that the objective of the ILO Convention No. 169 implicitly includes the rights of
indigenous peoples to their cultural heritage.
Admittedly, thebodyofthelLO ConventionNo. 169 does not expressly address
cultural resources or cultural property, but it does offer language which can be
interpreted as safeguarding indigenous peoples' heritage. For example, Article 4(1)
of this Convention declares:
special measures shall be adopted as appropriate for safeguarding the persons,
institutions, property, cultures and environment of the [indigenous and tribal]
peoples concerned.' 2'
Read together with Article 2(1) of the ILO Convention No. 169, which asserts that
[glovemments shall have the responsibility for developing, with the participation
of the [indigenous and tribal] peoples concerned, co-ordinated and systematic
action to protect the rights of these peoples and to guarantee respect for theirintegrity,12
the language of Article 4 can be interpreted as requiring governments to implement
affirmative domestic measures aimed at preserving the cultural resources of those
indigenous communities within their modern boundaries.
The strength of the ILO Convention No. 169 cannot be confined to the plain
meaning of its text. Rather, the process surrounding the Convention's formation, as
116. See Anayasupra note 112, at48.
117. Id. "The overriding reason for disappointment appeared to be grounded simplyin frustration over the inability
to dictate a convention in terms more sweeping than those included in the final text." Id.
118. See ILO Convention (169),supra note 111, at fifth preambularpara.; see also Anaya, supra note 112,at48.
119. See ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 111, at fifth preamble pama.
120. d
121. See ELO Convention (169), supra note 111, at art. 4.
122. Id at art. 2(1).
[Vol. 34:713
18
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 34 [1998], Iss. 4, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol34/iss4/6
1999] PROTECTING CULTURAL AND NATURAL HERITAGE 731
well as the increase in international attention to the rights of indigenous people, lends
weight to the contention that the Convention is part of emerging customary
international law and is an expression of a normative baseline for indigenous rights."
An important segment of this emerging norm is the recognition of Indigenous peoples'
rights to maintain and enhance their unique cultures through the control of their
heritage.
124
2. The United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(Draft Declaration)"z
In 1982, the U.N. Human Rights Commission, and the Economic and Social
Council established the U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Populations (Working
Group)." As an organ of the U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities (Subcommission), the Working Group was initially
assigned the task of reviewing developments affecting indigenous communities. 27
The Working Group's duty was expanded to the drafting of a declaration on
international standards concerning the rights of indigenous peoples in 1984.2 In
1988, the Working Group produced the first version of the draft and continued to
revise the document during ensuing meetings.2 9 By 1993, the Working Group
completed the final version of the Draft Declaration. The Sub-Commission adopted
this final draft in 1994 and submitted it to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.
130
The Draft Declaration provides greater clarity in regard to the treatment of
indigenous peoples' cultural resources, and reaffirms the requirement of governments
123. See Anaya, supra note 112, at 49-50, 52-54. Professor Anaya contends that customary law, or norms, need
not arise from the behavior of states in regard to "concrete events." Id. at 50. Rather, "[w]ith the advent of modem
international intergovernmental institutions and enhanced communications media, states and other relevant actors
increasingly engage in prescriptive dialogue." Id. It is this communication during multilateral settings, according to
Anaya, that brings "about a convergence of understanding and expectation about rules," which acts to pull countries
toward compliance in advance of a pattern of state conduct. Id. Therefore, explicit communications occurring between
authoritative actors, which do not necessarily have to be associated with concrete events, is another form of practice
which effectively forms customary rules. Id. See also infra Section InI.
124. See infra Section Ill, General Principles ofInternational Law, United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand
and accompanying text.
125. United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on Hum. Rts.,
11 th Sess., Annex 1, U.N. Doc. E/ CN.4/Sub.2 (1993). [hereinafter Draft Declaration]. Reprinted in Erica-Irene A.
Daes, Equality of Indigenous Peoples UndertheAuspicies of the United Nations-- Draft Declaration on the Rights
ofIndigenous Peoples, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 493,500 app. (1995).
126. HumanRights CommissionRes. 1982/19 (Mar. 10,1982); E.S.C. Res. 1982/34,May7,1982, U.N. ESCOR,
1982, Supp. No. I at 26, U.N. Doc. E/1982/82 (1982). For a discussion of the Working Group on Indigenous
Populations'establishment (hereafterWorking Group) see Russel Lawrence Brash, Indigenous Peoples: An Emerging
Object of International Law, 80 AM. J. INMrtL. 369,370-74 (1986); see also Anaya, supra note 112, at 51.
127. See Brash, supra note 126, at 372.
128. Id.
129. See Anaya, supra note 112, at 52.
130. IL See also, Report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection ofMinorities
on its Forty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. at 104, E/CN.4/1995 (1994). The Status of the Declaration remains in draft
form, a work in progress. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights did not adopt the Draft Declaration at its fifty-
second session. See generally, Report ofthe Working Group 1995/32 of3 March 1995, U.N. Doc., E/CN.4/1996/84
(1996).
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to take affirmative action in order "to secure indigenous culture in its many
manifestations.' ' 31 Article 12 of the Draft Declaration provides:
Indigenous peoples have the right to practice and revitalize their cultural traditions
and customs. This includes the right to maintain, protect and develop the past,
present and future manifestations of their cultures, such as archaeological and
historical sites, artifacts, designs, ceremonies, technologies and visual and
performing arts and literature, as well as the right to the restitution of cultural,
intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken without their free and informed
consent or in violation of their free and informed consent or in violation of their
laws, traditions and customs."
Furthermore, Article 13 asserts:
Indigenous peoples have the right to manifest, practice, develop and teach their
spiritual and religious traditions, customs and ceremonies; the right to maintain,
protect, and have access in privacy to their religious and cultural sites; the right to
the use and control of ceremonial objects; and the right to the repatriation of
human remains. States shall take effective measures, in conjunction with the
indigenous peoples concerned, to ensure that indigenous sacred places, including
burial sites, be preserved, respected and protected.
The interactive, global process of drafting the Declaration has led to the further
crystallization of expectations and international norms. Consequently, it could be
argued that the Draft Declaration expresses embryonic principles of international law.
In sum, therefore, the negotiation and adoption of the ILO Convention No. 169, as
well as the efforts of the Working Group to produce the Draft Declaration, 134 have
contributed to the seeming emergence of an "international law of indigenous
peoples."135 The ILO Convention No. 169 and theDraft Declaration define minimum
standards regarding Indigenous Peoples' rights to live and develop as unique societies,
including the need to safeguard indigenous cultural resources for the continued
nourishment of these communities. These legal instruments are evidence of a growing
body of customary international law which protects the cultural rights of indigenous
peoples. This strand of law must now be examined in conjunction with the general
principles of law.
131. See S.JAMEsANAYA, INDIGENOusPEOPLES INImNRNAIONALLAW 103 (1996).
132. Draft Declaration, supra note 125, at art 12.
133. Id. at art. 13."Throughtheprocess ofdrafing a declaration, the subcommission's Working Group on Indigenous
Populations engaged states, indigenous peoples, and others in an extended multilateral dialogue on the specific content
of norms concerning indigenous peoples and their rights." See Anaya, supra note 112, at 52
134. Id. at57.
135. Id. at 38(d).
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IV. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
There is no doubt that "general principles of law" enjoy parity of legal status
with treaties and custom, which are primary sources of international law. Even so,
general principles of law have never been perceived as having the importance of
treaties and custom. Nevertheless, the Statute of the International Court of Justice
underscored the primary status of "general principles" by characterizing the other
recognized sources of international law- "judicial decisions," and the "teachings of
the most highly qualified publicists"-- as "subsidiary" means for determining the
rules of law. 1
36
Hersch Lauterpacht designed a conceptual compass for dealing with lacunas
in the law: "[W]henever a question arises which is not governed by an existing rule
of international law... or in the absence of such a rule... the rich repository of
'general principles' may legitimately be resorted to by a tribunal, a Government, or
a scholar grappling with a novel or difficult situation." 137
Having recognized a repository of general principles as part of the broader
corpus of international law, we need to ascertain where this repository might be
located, and then identify any relevant principles regarding the rights of indigenous
peoples. Clearly, national legal systems are the repository of a substantial number
of general principles, and international law continues to recruit many of its rules
from national laws. 38 Hersch Lauterpacht authenticated the extent to which
international law is molded by domestic sources, analogies, and experience' 39 by
expressing rules of uniform application in all or in the main systems of
jurisprudence.1"
The general principles of law referred to can be adopted or derived from the way
in which countries with indigenous populations treat the cultural resources and
heritage of such people. In an effort to protect the rights of indigenous peoples, nation
states have begun to pass legislation that addresses their cultural rights. Specifically,
substantial efforts have been made by nation states in the area of cultural property. '41
Countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States have
enacted, or are in the process of enacting, legislation which facilitates the protection
of indigenous cultural property. This widespread practice among nation states
represents the emergence of a growing body of general principles of law concerning
indigenous cultural property.
While variations in the application of each state's protective legislation exist,
136. HERscH LAUrERPAcHT, INmIRAIIONAL LAW 68-74 (1970).
137. Id.
138. McNair, L. individual opinion International Status of South West Africa, 1950 I.CJ.128 at 148.
139. HERscHLAuERPACH'T, PRIvAE LAw SOURCES AND ANALOGmS OF INIERNAInONAL LAW (1970).
140. See id. at 69.
141. It is important to note that while this article points to the efforts made by states in attempting to protect the rights
of Indigenous Peoples, the people themselves often view the legislation of the Nation states as inadequate. This article
does not purport that the legislation mentioned is perfect in all ways, and certainly recognizes that there may be room
for improvement. The fact that the legislation exists is the main thrust in this section.
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significant similarities in the basic frameworks are apparent. First, most states have
recognized the importance of maintaining possession of cultural property in
indigenous peoples. This is demonstrated by the laws of various countries which
require repatriation of cultural property to indigenous peoples in certain circum-
stances. Second, most state legislation has the ultimate goal of granting the
indigenous peoples some form of control over their own cultural property. A brief
discussion of various state legislation follows.
A. United States
'Perhaps the most comprehensive legislative scheme for protection of
indigenous heritage can be found in the United States, where there are laws protecting
indigenous peoples rights to ceremonial objects, human remains, theuseof traditional
religious sites and exclusive marketing of artworks and crafts as "Indian"
products.""14  Specifically working to protect the cultural property of indigenous
peoples in the United States are the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA),143
the Archaeological Resources Protection Act (ARPA),'" and the Native American
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) 45
NHPA imposes protection on "districts, sites, buildings, structures, and objects
significant in American history, architecture, archaeology, engineering, and
culture." 46 Once an object or site has been deemed "protected," it is considered to
be either "historic property" or a "historic resource."' 7 Contained within the
definition of "historic properties" are what the National Park Service (NPS) has
deemed "traditional cultural properties" which are places that have religious or
cultural importance to a specific community of people. 48 As a result, the preserva-
tion of Native American sacred sites may be obtained through NHPA.
ARPA governs federal and Indian lands which have been found to contain
archeological resources. 149 Specifically, Congress stated the purpose of ARPA as
being: "to secure, for the present and future benefit of the American people, the
protection of archaeological resources and sites which are on public lands and Indian
lands, and to foster increased cooperation and exchange of information between
governmental authorities, the professional archaeological community, and private
5$150individuals having collections of archaeological resources....
As a result, ARPA functions as a regulator of excavations in that it requires
142. U.N. Study, supra note 36, at 14.
143. 16 U.S.C. §§470-470x-6 (1994).
144. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470mm (1994).
145. 25 U.S.C. §§3001-13 (1994).
146. 16 U.S.C. §470(a)(a)(1)(A) (1994).
147. Id at §470(f) and §470(w)(5).
148. See Patricia L. Parker and Thomas F. King, National Park Service, National Register Bulletin 38, Guidelines
for Evaluating and Documenting Traditional Cultural Properties (1990).
149. See 16 U.S.C. § 470aa (1994).
150. Id. at §470bb.
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anyone wishing to remove archaeological resources from federal or Indian lands to
obtain a permit from the federal land manager. Those seeking a permit must comply
with specific regulations created by the Secretaries of the Interior, Agriculture, and
Defense, as well as the Chairman of the Board of the Tennessee Valley Authority. 5 1
In addition, ARPA requires the federal land manager to notify the affected tribe when
considering any permit application that has the potential to result in "harm to, or
destruction of, any religious site." 2
"NAGPRA establishes a mandate and a process for the repatriation of the
physical remains of ancestors, funerary objects, and other sacred items that are in the
custody of federal agencies or federally funded museums to tribes, native Hawaiian
organizations, and lineal descendants. I5 3 NAGPRA further protects the physical
remains still imbedded in federal public lands or Indian lands.'" At its most basic
level, NAGPRA requires the return of all culturally affiliated material to the rightful
tribal owners."5 Consequently, NAGPRA requires all federally funded museums to
take an inventory of any physical remains in their possession and notify the relevant
tribal people.' 56 If it is determined that there is a cultural affiliation between the
remains and the people, the museums are required to return the remains to the tribe.15
B. Australia
Similar safeguarding of indigenous peoples' rights to cultural property is
occurring in other parts of the world. In Australia, there are several measures of
federal legislation which protect the rights of indigenous people. For example, the
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Act of 1984158 enables an aboriginal
group to petition the Commonwealth to declare an area of land or an object
"protected" if it is found to be significant to Aboriginal tradition and under threat of
injury or desecration. 9 Australia has also enacted the Protection of Movable
Cultural Heritage Act of 1986,1'6 which prohibits the exportation of indigenous
cultural property without a permit; and the Native Title Act of 1993,161 which
provides a framework for determining Native Title and a method for calculating
compensation when it has been extinguished. Furthermore, Australia created the
Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Studies which
recently conducted a study in order to examine the concerns of Indigenous People, the
existing legislation affecting cultural property, and the need for amendments or new
151. See id. at §470cc(a).
152. Id. at §470cc(c).
153. 25 U.S.C.§§ 3001-13 (1994); see also, Dean B. Suagee, Tribal Voices in Historic Preservation: Sacred
Landscapes, Cross-Cultural Bridges, and Common Ground, 21 VT. L. REV. 145,202 (1996).
154. 25 U.S.C. § 3002 (1994).
155. See id
156. See id. at § 3003.
157. See id. at § 3005.
158. Aboriginal and Tores Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act, 1984 Austl. C. Acts 78.
159. See id.
160. Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act, 1986 Austl. C. Acts 11.
161. Native Title Act, 1993 Austl. C. Act 110.
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legislation.162
Many Australian states have also enacted legislation protecting the cultural
property of indigenous peoples. For instance, Victoria has enacted the Archaeologi-
cal and Aboriginal Relics Preservation Act163 which enables the designation of
archeological areas in order to preserve cultural relics.164 Other events have occurred
in Australia which evidence its efforts to protect the cultural property of its
indigenous people. For example, in recent years, theAustralian government delegated
management authority of the Uluru National Park to the Aborigines in order to
facilitate greater protection of this Aboriginal sacred site. 65 Additionally, in the early
1980s, the Australian Crown ordered the return of the Crowther Collection, an
extensive array of skeletal material, to the Aboriginal community to dispose of as it
saw fit.' 6
C. Canada
Evidence of the emerging general principles of law concerning cultural property
can also be found in Canada. As with other countries, such.as the United States and
Australia, Canada has passed enabling legislation for the international treaties, such
as the 1970 UNESCO Convention, which it has ratified that protect cultural
property. 67 In addition, Canada's 1970 Indian Act provides certain protective
measures for the indigenous people of Canada and their cultural property.'68
Specifically, the Indian Act "prevents damage or destruction of specified cultural
property."' 69 "Pursuant to these powers, some band councils require archaeologists
to apply for permits to conduct research on their reserve."'"7 Although Canada's
Indian Act vests much of the control over Native cultural property in the Crown,
there is a proposed amendment which, if accepted, would provide for consultation
with Native tribes when their cultural property is at issue.'7 '
162. SeeAustralanInstite fAbrna andTorrestraitIslandertudiesComunission(ICPProject), Proposals
forthe Recognition and Protection of lndigenous Cultural and Intellectual Property at § 1.2.1 (visited May 7,1998)
<http'J/www.icip.lawnet.com.au/index.html>.
163. Archaeological and Aboriginal Relics Preservation Act of1972, §A628, in JOHNMCCORQUoDALE, ABowGms
AND-mLAw: ADIGcsT87 (1987).
164. See id.
165. See U.N. Study, supra note 36, at 12.
166. See Renfrew, supra note 55, at 465.
167. Cultural Property Export and Import Act, R.S.C. chs. 46-54 (1975) (Can.); see also Simpson, supra note 56.
168. IndianAct R.S.C. chs. 1-6 (1970) (Can.).
169. Id.atchs. 1-5 §91.
170. Catherine Bell, Aboriginal Claims to Cultural Property in Canada: A Comparative Legal Analysis of the
Repatriation Debate, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 457, 492 (1992).
171. See id. The proposed legislation entitled Archaeological Heritage Protection Act would provide for
consultation with Indigenous Peoples when cultural property is an issue. The Act was tabled in 1990. See also, Marion
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D. New Zealand
Another example of a nation state working to protect the rights of indigenous
people is that of New Zealand and its treatment of the Maori. New Zealand's
Antiquities Act17 places the government in a protectionist role and allows the Maori
Land Court to decide issues of ownership concerning any Maori artifact found
anywhere in New Zealand.173 Specifically, the Antiquities Act provides:
Every person who, after the commencement of this Act, finds any artifact
anywhere in New Zealand or within the territorial waters of New Zealand shall,
within 28 days of finding the artifact, notify either the Secretary or the nearest
public museum, which shall notify the Secretary.... 7
Once the Secretary has been informed of the discovery, the Maori Land Court
determines ownership. 175
In addition, the government of New Zealand has attempted to assist the Maori
in repatriating their cultural property. For instance, in 1988, the New Zealand High
Court issued an injunction against auctioneers in London to prevent the sale of a
tattooed head.176 This action prompted a settlement and the head was returned to the
Maori in order to receive a proper burial."1f
The actions of each of these countries demonstrate an international effort to
protect the cultural property of indigenous people and to recognize their right to the
continued preservation and possession of their heritage. The effect of weaving this
strand of international law with the other strands of treaty and customary law is to
create an unmistakable tapestry displaying the cultural protection of indigenous
peoples.
V. A JURISPRUDENTIAL FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING THE CULTURAL HERI-
TAGE OF HUMANKIND
A. Views on Cultural Heritage
This article is premised on two foundational, albeit controversial, views about
cultural heritage: First, from an indigenous perspective, cultural resources are the
patrimony of the peoples and communities to whom they first belonged or from whom
they originated. Second, from an archaeological, historical and scientific standpoint,
cultural heritage is an endangered and non-renewable part of the data bank of the
172. 1975 N.Z. Stat. 337.
173. See iL
174. Id.at§1(3)
175. See id. at §12. See generally, Lyndel V. Prott, Cultural Rights as Peoples'Rights in International Law, in
THE Rirms OF PEOnLES 100-01, James Crawford, ed. (1992).




Guruswamy et al.: Protecting the Cultural and Natural Heritage: Finding Common Grou
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1998
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
world. This heritage is of such social, environmental, scientific, educational and
cultural importance that it should be brought out of the realm of any particular tribe
or peoples' patrimony, and accepted into the cultural heritage of all humanity. 7 '
In fact, the two concepts supporting the rights of indigenous peoples and the
cultural heritage of humankind are not free-standing or stand alone constructs, and
should more accurately be understood as two interlacing strands in the dappled
tapestry of International Law. These strands form part of the emerging portrait of
international law that protects indigenous rights, a well as the cultural heritage of
humanity.
As discussed in Part I, the cultural resources of indigenous peoples are an
integral part of their cultural and religious heritage, identity and patrimony.
Indigenous and native people have historically been subject to victimization,
discrimination, and domination which has left their cultural heritage threatened. To
American Indians, for example, cultural resources "represent not only the past but
also the present; they are the legacy derived from hundreds of generations of
ancestors."17 9 For them the past lives on in the present, and historical properties are
not merely data or part of the archaeological record; they represent and symbolize
whole classes of natural events.'8 0 In some circumstances, Native communities are
satisfied with the oral traditions regarding their history, and may find it offensive for
archaeologists to presume they have a need for additional "gap-filling" historical
information. As such, archaeologists should balance the need to obtain scientific
information through studies and excavations against the potential harm that these
activities will cause living communities.
It is, of course, possible that indigenous peoples may reject the intrusion of
archaeologists and other scientists because of the terrible injustices suffered by
them.' Some tribes, like the Zuni, who occupy sites that may be deemed part of the
cultural heritage of humankind, dislike being treated as living museums, and may
resist attempts to interfere with their use of those sites on historical, archaeological
or scientific grounds.8 2 Further, some Kootenai believe that their cultural resources
should be left alone, and that archaeologists should be kept from the resources on the
reservation.8
3
178. These two premises appear to contradict each other, and may appear to mirror what John Merryman has
described as two ways ofthinking about cultural property. He described one as "cultural nationalism" which isretentive
or possessive in a nationalistic sense, and gives a nation state the right to keep such property within its territories even
where itis guilty of neglecting oreven destroying such property. He contrasts thiswith "cuItural internationalism" which
is more cosmopolitan and is based on a broader global concern for humanity's cultural heritage. While Merryman
makes a cogent case for cultural internationalism, this paper will argue that subsequent developments have changed the
contours of international law dealing with the rights of indigenous peoples to their cultural heritage. These laws,
described in Section 2(b) have effectively countervailed what Merryman describes as the "reigning assumption" about
the "cultural nationalism" and the possessive rights of nation states to cultural property and the cultural heritage of
humankind. See Merryman, supra note 80 at 846.
179. Roger Anyon, "Protecting the Past, Protecting the Present: Cultural Resources andAmerican Indians" in
PROTECUNGTHEPAsr, (George S. Smith & John E. Ehrenhard, eds 215 1991).
180. Seeid. at216.
181. SeePartI (C) infra.
182. See Anyon, supra note 179, at 218.
183. See id at220.
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Despite such beliefs, the common heritage concept is a preservationist concept
which may encourage indigenous peoples to recognize that it is a protective canopy
for their cultural resources. Thus the Hopi in Arizona work with the state and
archaeologists to study ancestral ruins and develop them as a park for public
education and enjoyment.184 The same may be true of some of the sites of outstanding
universal value under the 1972 UNESCO Convention. Thus, the common heritage
concept is one that could be accepted by indigenous peoples.
Nation states that were the victims of colonialism, for the most part, are now
able to assert their identity in the present geo-political international community of co-
equal sovereign states. By contrast, we have seen that indigenous peoples have been
denied recognition as international subjects, and have often been the victims of
nationalistic fervor directed at eradicating their identity as peoples."85 Consequently,
indigenous peoples have a stronger argument for preserving and fostering their fragile
and endangered cultures than nation states.
Others concerned about cultural resources including archaeologists, scientists,
and educators see cultural property through somewhat different lenses. There is
among them a growing acceptance of a common cultural heritage that is distinct from
the ownership of objects, monuments or sites. The UNESCO conventions refer to
cultural heritage in both national and international contexts. The 1970 UNESCO
convention refers to the cultural heritage of each state,186 while the preamble to the
1972 UNESCO convention on the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural
Heritage sees cultural heritage as an international phenomenon. The preamble
decries the deterioration or disappearance of cultural and natural heritage as "a
harmful impoverishment of the heritage of all nations of the world" and urged that
"it is incumbent on the international community as a whole to participate in the
protection of the cultural and natural heritage.""' The 1995 UNIDRO1T convention
recognizes the cultural heritage of "tribal, indigenous or other communities as well
as the heritage of "all peoples. 188
Cultural heritage, as a concept, is expressed in three different ways by the
relevant treaties. The 1970 UNESCO Convention sees it as the heritage of each
184. See id.
185. See Part I (C) infra.
186. See UNESCO Convention, supra note 28, at Art. 4.
187. See 1972 UNESCO Convention, supra note 28, at Art. 149. The term "common heritage" is also articulated
in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which treats the "Area" of the sea beyond the
jurisdiction of states as the "common heritage of mankind." Art 149 of UNCLOS declares that all objects of an
archaeological and historical nature found in the Area shall be preserved or disposed for the benefit of mankind as a
whole." It should be noted, however, that the common heritage of mankind embodied in UNCLOS is an exploitative
and not a preservationist concept. Its primary focus is to ensure that the resources of the sea, such as deep sea nodules,
are the common heritage of mankind, and should therefore, be exploited for the benefit of the entire international
community. These resources are not to be treated as res communes that are free to be appropriated by the technologically
advanced nations that may find or harvest them. Unlike the 1972 UNESCO Convention, the reference to disposal in
Art 149 of UNCLOS clearly opens the door to these archaeological items being sold. There is no bonding duty to
preserve such items. This is confirmed by Article 303 (3) of UNCLOS that recognizes the rights of identifiable owners
and law of salvage applicable to archaeological and historical objects.
188. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 29, at Preamble para 3.
1999]
27
Guruswamy et al.: Protecting the Cultural and Natural Heritage: Finding Common Grou
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1998
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
nation, the 1972 UNESCO Convention characterizes cultural resources as the
heritage of humanity, while the 1995 UNIDRO1T convention views cultural heritage
as national, tribal or indigenous while simultaneously also recognizing it as the
"heritage of all people ''1 89
The 1972 Convention, however, broke new ground by introducing a different
strand of law and policy. On the one hand it recognizes that the "duty of ensuring the
identification, protection, conservation, presentation and transmission to future
generations of the cultural and natural heritage ...situated on its territory, belongs
primarily to the state."' 1  At the same time it also recognizes that "such heritage
constitutes a world heritage for whose protection it is the duty of the international
community as a whole to co-operate."' 91 It breathes life into this embryonic duty by
creating a Fund for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage of
Outstanding Universal Value called the World heritage Fund,192 to which all States
Parties are compelled to contribute. 93 What is important here is the manner in which
the sovereign rights of States is juxtaposed with the duty of the international
community to co-operate and financially contribute to the protection of the common
heritage of humanity. The commitment to protect the cultural heritage is taken a step
further by the 1995 UNIDROIT convention which recognizes the cultural heritage of
indigenous peoples, and opens the door to protecting that heritage as part of the
shared heritage of humanity.
The duty of theinternational community to protect the world's common cultural
heritage must be interwoven with the other more recent strands of jurisprudence that
recognize indigenous peoples' rights to their associated cultural heritage. We have
seen that new norms are being created.'" Even if they have not yet achieved full form
and status as matured norms of international law, they call to be recognized as newly
birthed principles of international law that recognize the cultural integrity of
indigenous peoples. In this situation the state rights to preserve and protect the
cultural resources of indigenous peoples must now pass to their rightful custodians.
The Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples expresses this
position by declaring that "Indigenous peoples are entitled to the recognition of the
full ownership, control and protection of their cultural and intellectual property."'9 5
The more cautious ILO Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples states
"governments shall respect the special importance for the cultures and spiritual values
of the peoples concerned of their relationship with the lands and territories or both"' 96
What we are seeing here is a recognition of the importance of cultural resources and
the need to protect them.
Our analysis must include one final strand. This strand consists of the general
189. Id.
190. 1972 UNESCO Convention, supra note 28, at Art. 4.
191. Id. at Art 6(1).
192. See id. at Art 15(1).
193. See id. at Art 15(3)(a).
194. See Part I and Part I, infra.
195. Draft Declaration, supra note 125, at Art 29.
196. ILO Convention, supra note 111, at Art 13.
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principles of international law as codified in Art. 38(c) of the Statue of the
International Court of Justice. Hersch Lauterpacht authenticated the extent to which
international law is molded by domestic sources, analogies, and experience. 7 He also
demonstrated how Article 38 directs the Court to apply the "general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations."19 By "general principles" he referred to principles
of law expressing rules "of uniform application in all or in the main systems of
private jurisprudence."19 While Lauterpacht applied his reasoning to private law
analogies, the principle underlying his thesis, on a parity of reasoning, is equally
applicable to domestic public and regulatory law analogies.
We have seen how some States with indigenous peoples have dealt with their
cultural resources. We have also seen that the rights of indigenous peoples to their
cultural property is receiving increased recognition, not only as treaty and customary
law, but also as general principles of law. In light of the rights of indigenous peoples,
how should we approach the apparently conflicting claims of indigenous peoples and
the global community to their cultural heritage?
B. Incorporating Cultural Heritage Protection
The first step toward resolving these tensions is to accept that indigenous
peoples have the first claim to their cultural heritage. By recognizing the rights of
indigenous peoples to their patrimony we open the window to a different concept of
property: the concept of communal property.' On the whole, indigenous peoples are
more interested in protecting and preserving their heritage than in asserting claims of
property ownership. As one commentator expressed it, "[Non Indian concepts of
private land ownership and individual property rights, as they extend to cultural
resources are appalling to most Indians."" t Many of these peoples have been the
victims of Euro-American collectors whose desire to own Indian arts and artifacts has
led to the despoliation and desecration of many sites of religious and cultural value
to Native people.
The second step is to take positive steps to protect those parts of the cultural
heritage of humankind that belongs to indigenous peoples by compensating them for
acting as the stewards of the international community. Using the 1995 UNIDROT
convention's recognition of the cultural heritage of humanity and indigenous peoples'
rights as its baseline, this paper argues that the indigenous peoples, to whom cultural
resources belong, can hold and preserve such cultural resources as the trustees of the
international community. Such a conclusion is the logical outcome of interpreting the
UNIDROIT convention in conjunction with the burgeoning body of international law,
as expressed in the ILO Convention (169) and the Draft Declaration which recognize
the rights of indigenous peoples. This is further strengthened by the general
principles of law adopted by nations with significant indigenous populations that
197. H. LAuIFRACHT, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law (Archon Books 1970) (1927).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 69.
200. See Part I (C), supra.
201. Anyon, supra note 179, at 216.
1999]
29
Guruswamy et al.: Protecting the Cultural and Natural Heritage: Finding Common Grou
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1998
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
recognize the rights of indigenous peoples to their cultural heritage.
By upholding the rights of indigenous peoples the international community has
opened the door to protecting the indigenous base, and not merely the national apex
of the cultural heritage pyramid. But the implementation of these principles requires
that the indigenous communities be compensated or otherwise rewarded by the
international community so that they might assume a role as the cultural stewards of
humankind. This raises the question of how this compensation is to be acheived.
The modem international community should treat endangered cultural resources
in a manner analogous to other global problems, such as global warming and the
depletion of biological diversity. A foundational operating premise of the interna-
tional treaties dealing with these global challenges is the principle of common but
differentiated responsibility (CBDR).' Based on their different social and economic
conditions, CBDR incorporates the equitable notion that developed countries should
assume primary responsibility for addressing these common concerns of humanity.
A look at how this principle works in the Climate Change treaty and the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is instructive. Under the Climate Change
treaty CBDR, while explicitly incorporated, is in fact weakened by the manner of its
application. Nonetheless, it remains an obligation which has been accepted by the
developed nations of the world. According to Art.4(3), Annex II parties (OECD
members only) must pay for all the reporting requirements undertaken by developing
countries. This includes the developing countries' obligation to create national
inventories of GHGs under Art.4(1) and to communicate such information to the
COP under Art.12. In addition to the full costs of reporting, the Annex II parties
must also pay for the full incremental costs of projects undertaken by developing
countries to fulfill the latter's general commitments pursuant to.Art.4(1). However,
these projects- such as designating and maintaining a sustainable rainforest
preserve- must be approved by the financial mechanism. 3The Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD) recognizes that the preservation of biological diversity
is the "common concern of humankind." It, too, implicitly accepts the principle of
202. Thisprincipleis specifically articulated in the Preamblepara 6, and Art 3(l) ofthe Climate Change Convention.
See Climate Change Convention, supra note 2.
203. The Global Environment Facility (GEF) has been named the "interim" financial mechanism (Art21(3)). The
present "restructured" GEF meets the criteria of Art. 11(2) that the financial mechanism have an "equitable and
balanced representation of all Parties within a transparent system ofgovernance." To summarize the restructured GEF,
the entity now has both a Council and an independent Secretariat, and the GEF will continue to work closely with the
Conferenceofthe parties (COP) inchannelingnecessaryresourcestodevelopingcountries. Concerning adaptationcosts
- the costs involved in dealing with the effects of higher seas and higher temperatures - Annex II parties have a fairly
vague financial responsibility to developing countries. Art.4(4) merely states that Annex 11 parties "shall also assist the
developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of
adaptation to those adverse effects." Coupled with Art.4(8), this commitment could require Annex I countries to pay
for a number of adaptation measures, such as the construction of sea walls for small island countries. With adaptation
costs presumably several decades away, however, the full weight of this provision awaits development by future
Conferences of the Parties. Id.
Finally, with regard to technology transfer, the developing countries settled for a rather weak commitment in Art.4(5),
which stipulates that developed countries "shall take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as
appropriate, the transfer of... environmentally sound technologies." The FCCC, therefore, contains a greater emphasis
on financial costs than on the transfer of technology. Some transfer of technology is expected though, and it will either
take place through joint implementation projects or through the financial mechanism itself. All Annex II parties must
include measures taken for the transfer of technology in their national communications to the COP. Id.
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CBDR. Under the CBD, developed countries must pay "to enable developing country
Parties to meet the agreed full incremental costs to them of implementing measures
which fulfill the obligations of this Convention."0 4 Again, as stated above, this
provision impliedly enshrines the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsi-
bility (CBDR) as noted in Principle 7 of the 1992 Rio Declaration, in which
developed countries acknowledged their greater financial responsibility in addressing
global environmental degradation. Developed countries, listed in an annex adopted
at the first meeting of the Conference of the Parties (Annex I), will channel their
contributions through the newly restructured interim financial mechanism, the Global
Environment Facility (GEF).
Following the Programme Priorities laid down by the COP, the GEF will then
fund individual projects put forth by the developing countries -- the "incremental cost"
to be determined by individual negotiations between the GEF and the respective
applicant. Also, developed countries may bypass the GEF through regional, bilateral
and multilateral channels under Art.20(3), but the extent to which such funding might
meet a developing country's financial obligations under the CBD remains an open
question for the COP.
What emerges is that CBDR is accepted in principle, while the manner of its
implementation is left to be resolved according to the particular circumstances. As we
have seen, the Climate Change Convention deals with the principle quite differently
from the CBD. There is no doubt that the mechanism for protecting the cultural
heritage of humankind will need to take account of the different aspects of the cultural
heritage.
C. Legal and Institutional Implementation
The institutional structures that arise out of the legal foundations delineated in
this paper will depend to a great extent on the degree to which the need for such
institutions are identified. The steps taken should demonstrate that the indigenous
peoples of the world are seriously committed to protecting their cultural heritage, and
that such an endeavor requires the financial commitment of the international
community.
A first step in protecting the cultural heritage of humanity would be to catalog
or inventory these cultural resources. The importance or the difficulty of such an
undertaking cannot be underestimated. But such a cataloging has become a central
and critical part of the effort to protect the biological diversity of the world,25 and
must assume the same significance in any effort to protect the cultural heritage of
humankind. The initial undertakings in this direction have been taken by the
Mataatua Declaration of 1993,' and the Julayinbul Statement of Indigenous
Intellectual Property Rights of 1993.707 Those entities gathered at these conferences
204. ArL20(2)
205. See generally, E. 0. WILSON, BIODVERsITY (E.O. Wilson ed. 1988).




Guruswamy et al.: Protecting the Cultural and Natural Heritage: Finding Common Grou
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1998
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
could undertake this task to demonstrate that there are numerous aspects of cultural
heritage which are presently unprotected and at risk.
A second challenge will be to "rank order" such a heritage, as odious as this
might sound to the cultural literati. International resources directed to the protection
of cultural heritage are bound to be limited; therefore, selectivity must be exercised
in deciding for which parts of the cultural heritage the International community
should pay. The fact that monies are not channeled to a resource does not detract
from its value, it is merely an administrative decision based on the availability of
funds and the risk to a specific cultural resource. This would be too contentious and
divisive to be undertaken by the cataloging body and would need to be left to the
funding agency.
The nature and form of the institutions that will be charged with protecting both
the cultural rights of indigenous peoples as well as the cultural heritage of the world
is a matter for speculation. It is conceivable that existing institutions such as the
"World Heritage Committee" established under the 1972 UNESCO could be
expanded to fill this role. This Committee is already identifying cultural properties
of "outstanding universal value" and could extend their mandate to include a greater
range of resources. There may be room for environmental institutions to adopt
cultural sites within their areas of operation. On the other hand, a new committee set
up under the ILO Convention (169) could possibly play this role.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is a need for the greater protection of the cultural heritage of humankind.
Significant aspects of this cultural heritage belong to indigenous peoples, but the
existing law largely ignores their rights, and such an exclusion calls for redress. This
article proposes that existing international law should be supplemented and
augmented in order to effectuate such restitution. The concept of common but
differentiated responsibility (CBDR), established in analogous situations dealing with
climate change and biological diversity, can be adapted to address the indigenous
cultural heritage. The CBDR concept will help to preserve and protect the indigenous
cultural heritage by compensating indigenous communities for their stewardship of
the cultural heritage of humankind.
[Vol. 34:713
32
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 34 [1998], Iss. 4, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol34/iss4/6
